DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS 

 

 
Application for the Correction of 
the Coast Guard Record of: 
 
                                                                                BCMR Docket No. 2000-095 
 
 
   

 
ANDREWS, Attorney-Advisor: 
 

FINAL DECISION 

 
This  proceeding  was  conducted  according  to  the  provisions  of  section  1552  of 
 
title 10 and section 425 of title 14 of the United States Code.  The application was filed 
on January 4, 2000, and completed on March 20, 2000, upon the BCMR’s receipt of the 
applicant’s military and medical records. 
 
 
members who were designated to serve as the Board in this case. 
 

This final decision, dated March 7, 2001, is signed by the three duly appointed 

REQUEST FOR RELIEF 

 
The applicant, a former xxxxxxx in the Coast Guard, asked the Board to correct 
 
his military record to show that he was medically retired from the Coast Guard with a 
50-percent disability rate on xxxxxxx, instead of being separated from the Coast Guard 
with severance pay due to a 10-percent disability rating.  
 

APPLICANT’S ALLEGATIONS 

 
The applicant alleged that he was unjustly removed from the temporary disabil-
 
ity retired list (TDRL) and discharged with severance pay when he should have been 
medically retired from the Coast Guard.  He alleged that a Central Physical Evaluation 
Board (CPEB) that met on October 14, 1999, wrongly determined that he was only 10-
percent disabled, even though his condition has not improved since he was placed on 
the TDRL with a 50-percent disability rating in 1994.  He alleged that he was not given 
any opportunity to appear before the CPEB or to provide medical evidence for its con-
sideration. 
 

SUMMARY OF THE APPLICANT’S MEDICAL AND MILITARY RECORDS 

 
 
On  November  10,  1980,  the  applicant  enlisted  in  the  Coast  Guard  after  having 
served three years in the Navy.  He served on active duty in the Coast Guard continu-
ously thereafter for nearly 14 years. 
 
 
The applicant’s medical records show that he hurt his neck during a car accident 
in 1981 and another in 1984.  He fell off a ladder in 1990 and hurt his left leg.  In March 
1992, he reported further injuring his back while attempting to move a safe as he was 
rearranging the furniture in an office with two other members.  After his car was rear-
ended  in  August  1992,  he  complained  of  severe  pain  in  his  back,  neck,  and  left  arm, 
which  was  somewhat  alleviated  by  treatment.  In  September  1993,  after  another  car 
accident, he suffered further pain and numbness in his left arm and shoulder.  
 
 
On November 19, 1993, the applicant was evaluated by an Initial Medical Board 
(IMB).  He reported suffering persistent pain and numbness over most of his left side, 
including  his  left  arm,  leg,  neck,  and  back.    Two  years  of  pain  medications,  steroid 
injections,  facet  blocks,  and  physical  therapy  had  apparently  provided  little  relief.  
Multiple MRIs and EMGs had showed normal or inconclusive results.  The IMB found 
that he suffered from left hemianesthesia (numbness of the left side) and left S1 radicu-
lopathy (nerve root disease in the S1 vertebra).  However, he did not have any muscular 
atrophy, and “multiple services … have failed to fully explain his pain.  He does have 
the Waddell signs which tend to signify a non-organic functional overlay to his pain.”1  
The doctors in the Neurology Department at xxxxxx Medical Center determined that he 
was not a candidate for surgery.  The IMB found that he was unable to perform active 
duty and recommended that he be evaluated CPEB. 
 
 
On March 16, 1994, the applicant was examined by a neurologist at xxxxxxx Air 
Force Base pursuant to his being evaluated by a CPEB.  The neurologist reported that 
the applicant had “significant give-way weakness in the left upper and lower extremi-
ties, but at maximal effort, strength was as above [5/5].”  The neurologist concluded the 
following: 
 

Lower Back Pain: this patient has undergone multiple, extensive evaluations at multiple 
medical facilities.  His exam today is consistent with non-organic numbness and weak-
ness of the left upper and lower extremities.  There may be a component of real pain, but 
no spasm was evident on exam and the patient was very dramatic in his reactions to the 
exam, but was able to dress/undress with relative ease.  I believe that the patient would 
be best served by relying  on  objective finding to establish  the extent  of true  pathology 
present.  Serial MRI’s of the lumbar and cervical spine have been normal—most recently 
in March 1994. 

                                                 
1    Waddell  signs  indicate  psychological  or  other  non-physical  factors  may  be  causing  or  increasing  a 
patient’s complaints of pain. 

 

 
 
The  neurologist  also  reported  that  previous  EMGs  were  inconclusive,  but  one 
EMG  apparently  showed  “slow  bilateral  median  nerve  conduction  at  the  wrists,  left 
worse than right; evidence of denervation of selected left shoulder muscles, left upper 
limb,  cervical  paraspinals,  left  leg,  and  lumbar  paraspinals.    Impression:  left  C5,  C6 
radiculopathy, left L5 radiculopathy.”  However, the doctor who conducted that EMG 
provided no details of the test, other than this conclusion, despite three requests for the 
complete report by the neurologist.  Therefore, the neurologist concluded that the find-
ings might be unreliable and that the applicant should undergo a further EMG “to bet-
ter assess the degree of organic injury” and a psychological assessment. 
 
 
On  May  11,  1994,  the  applicant  underwent  a  psychological  assessment  by  two 
clinical psychologists for the Air Force.  They found that he suffered from chronic pain 
due  to  “intervertebral  disc  syndrome—cervical—mild  [and]  lumbrosacral  strain  with 
characteristic pain on motion” and from “psychological factors affecting physical con-
dition.” 
 
 
In July 1994, the applicant again underwent thorough testing after complaining 
of severe pain in his left shoulder and arm.  A neurologist diagnosed him with C5-C7 
radiculopathy  with  radiographic  evidence  of  C5-C7  neural  foraminal  narrowing  and 
electrodiagnostic  evidence  of  C5-C6  radiculopathy;  myofascial  pain  syndrome  with 
trigger points in left trapezius and left sternocleidomastoid muscles with referred pain; 
and degenerative changes in the cervical spine.  This is the last medical record in his 
military  medical  file.    All  subsequent  medical  records  appear  in  his  files  from  the 
Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA). 
 
 
On  September  7,  1994,  the  president  of  a  Formal  Physical  Evaluation  Board 
(FPEB) sent the applicant a letter informing him that he had been found 40 percent dis-
abled by severe, recurring attacks of intervertebral disc syndrome and 20 percent dis-
abled by lumbosacral strain with muscle spasms on extreme bending forward and with 
loss of lateral spine motion.  His combined, total disability was found to be 50 percent.  
The FPEB determined that the disabilities might be permanent, and the applicant was 
placed on the TDRL. 
 
 
On October 12, 1994, the applicant was placed on the TDRL, having performed 
almost 14 years of active duty in the Coast Guard; 3 years of active duty in the Navy; 
and 17 years, 9 months, and 20 days of total active and inactive military service. 
 
 
In  December  1994,  the  applicant  applied  to  the  DVA  for  benefits  and  was 
awarded a 40-percent combined disability rating on June 20, 1995.  The combined rating 
was based on degenerative changes of the cervical spine, C5-C6-C7 (20 percent); degen-
erative  changes  of  the  lumbosacral  spine  (20  percent);  and  hypertension  (10  percent).  
The  applicant  appealed  his  disability  rating,  but  it  was  confirmed  on  November  24, 

 

1995.  However, since then, he has reapplied to the DVA several times, and his com-
bined disability rating has risen to 50 percent due to a new 10-percent disability rating 
for  arthritis  in  his  right  ankle,  which  he  had  fractured  while  in  the  service,  and  an 
increase in his hypertension disability rating to 20 percent. 
 
 
Following further medical examinations, the applicant’s case was reviewed by a 
CPEB that met on March 7, 1997.  On April 7, 1997, his appointed counsel sent him a 
letter informing him that the CPEB had found him to be only 10 percent disabled by 
“lumbosacral strain: with characteristic pain on motion” and had recommended that he 
be separated with severance pay.  The letter stated that he had 15 days from the date of 
notification to accept or reject the CPEB’s findings by returning an enclosed form, CG-
4809.  If he accepted them, he would be separated with severance pay.  If he rejected 
them, he would receive orders to appear before a Formal Physical Evaluation Board at 
Coast Guard Headquarters within three weeks, and he would be  assigned counsel to 
assist him.  The letter also stated that failure to respond within 15 days “may result in 
your  being  deemed  to  have  accepted  the  findings  and  recommended  disposition, 
regardless of any opposite intent or untimely filed rejection.” 
 
 
On April 15, 1997, the applicant rejected the findings and recommendation of the 
CPEB.  Because of this rejection, no further action was taken, and he was retained on the 
TDRL. 
 
 
The  applicant’s  DVA  files  indicate  that  he  underwent  several  medical  tests  in 
1999 pursuant to his pending removal from the TDRL.  The tests showed two “minor 
abnormalities”: focal spondylosis at C5-C6 and C6-C7 and mild compression at L1.   
 
 
On October 14, 1999, a CPEB reviewed the applicant’s record, found him to be 10 
percent  disabled,  and  recommended  that  he  be  discharged  with  severance  pay.    The 
CPEB found that he was 10 percent disabled by “intervertebral disc syndrome, cervical: 
mild”  and  zero  percent  disabled  by  “lumbosacral  strain:  with  slight  subjective  symp-
toms only.” 
 
 
On October 25, 1999, the applicant’s counsel for the medical board process, who 
was the Chief of the Physical Disability Evaluation System (PDES) DES Legal Division, 
sent the applicant a letter notifying him that the CPEB had found him 10 percent dis-
abled and recommended that he be separated with severance pay.  The letter stated that 
he had 15 days from the date of notification to accept or reject the CPEB’s findings by 
returning an enclosed form, CG-4809.  If he accepted them, he would be separated with 
severance pay.  If he rejected them, he would receive orders to appear before an FPEB at 
Coast Guard Headquarters within three weeks, and he would be  assigned counsel to 
assist him.  The letter also asked the applicant to telephone the Chief of the PDES Legal 
Division within three days of receiving the letter.  A cover letter on this package signed 
by the Commander of CGPC on October 18, 1999, informed the applicant that if he did 

 

not respond within 15 days, he might “forfeit important rights in the disability evalua-
tion process.”   
 
On November 30, 1999, the applicant signed the CG-4809, rejecting the findings 
 
and recommendations of the CPEB.  The same day, the form was signed by the Chief of 
the PDES Legal Division, and the applicant was assigned counsel. 
 
 
On December 1, 1999, CGPC sent the applicant a letter informing him that the 
findings of the CPEB had been approved on November 30, 1999.  The letter informed 
him  that  as  a  result  of  the  approval,  he  had  been  discharged  effective  as  of  xxxxxxx, 
1999, and would receive severance pay. 
 

VIEWS OF THE COAST GUARD 

On November 15, 2000, the Chief Counsel of the Coast Guard recommended that 

 
 
the Board deny the applicant the requested relief. 
 
 
The  Chief  Counsel  stated  that  relief  should  be  denied  because  the  applicant 
failed to respond to the notification of the findings and recommendations of the CPEB 
in a timely manner.  He alleged that the CPEB’s report and form CG-4809 were sent to 
the applicant on October 25, 1999, by certified mail with a return receipt and that the 
receipt was signed and returned to CGPC on October 30, 1999.  (He provided the BCMR 
with a photocopy of that receipt.)  Therefore, the Chief Counsel argued, the applicant 
had 15 working days from October 30, 1999, to respond and should have responded by 
November 22, 1999.   
 
 
The Chief Counsel submitted an affidavit by the applicant’s counsel indicating 
that he telephoned the applicant on November 11, 1999, to counsel the applicant about 
returning the CG-4809.  During that telephone call, according to the affidavit, the appli-
cant indicated his desire to reject the CPEB’s recommendation, but his CG-4809 was not 
received in time.  The Chief Counsel stated that the applicant’s oral telephone statement 
to his counsel “was ineffective as a means to reject the CPEB’s findings.” 
 
The  Chief  Counsel  further  stated  that  the  applicant  faxed  his  form  CG-4809, 
 
rejecting the findings and recommendations of the CPEB, to his counsel on November 
30, 1999, the same day that the CPEB’s recommendation was approved by CGPC.  The 
Chief Counsel alleged that the applicant faxed his CG-4809 to his counsel that day only 
because his counsel telephoned him and faxed him a duplicate CG-4809 to return.  The 
Chief Counsel argued that the applicant’s late rejection of the CPEB’s report was “inef-
fective as a matter of regulation because it was delivered eight calendar days after the 
expiration of the 15 working day period.” 
 

 

 
The Chief Counsel argued that the applicant was not denied due process.  In the 
absence of such error, he argued, the applicant “must prove that the process that lead to 
the  denial  of  a  hearing  before  the  FPEB  …  ‘shocks  the  sense  of  justice.’”  See  Reale  v. 
United  States,  208  Ct.  Cl.  1010,  1011  (1976)  (“Injustice”  is  treatment  by  the  military 
authority that shocks the sense of justice, but is not technically illegal).  The Chief Coun-
sel  alleged  that  the  applicant  has  not  proved  that  he  has  suffered  an  injustice  that 
“shocks the senses.”  He alleged that the applicant had been evaluated by a CPEB twice 
before, in 1994 and 1997, and both times had properly signed and returned a CG-4809, 
indicating his intention.  Therefore, the Chief Counsel argued, the applicant was famil-
iar with the process and the need to respond within 15 days. 
 
 
CPEB acted arbitrarily and capriciously in finding him 10 percent disabled. 
 

Finally, the Chief Counsel argued that the applicant has failed to prove that the 

SUMMARY OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF THE APPLICANT’S COUNSEL 

 
 
On November 7, 2000, the applicant’s counsel, who has been Chief of the PDES 
Legal Division since 1995, signed an affidavit concerning his communications with the 
applicant.  He stated that he received the CPEB’s report on or about October 18, 1999, 
and  was  required  to  forward  it  to  the  applicant  within  five  working  days.    He  for-
warded  the  report  to  the  applicant  in  a  certified  letter,  return  receipt  requested,  on 
October  25,  1999.    When  he  called  the  applicant  on  or  about  November  11,  1999,  “to 
ascertain his decision to accept or reject his CPEB findings,” the applicant told him that 
“he was rejecting the findings and requesting a formal board.”  The counsel stated that 
he telephoned the applicant a second time, about seven to ten days later, to inform him 
that his CG-4809 had not been received.  During the second call, the counsel stated, the 
applicant told him that he had mailed his CG-4809 to the counsel soon after the first 
telephone call.  The counsel stated that he still did not receive the applicant’s CG-4809 
and so called him a third time on November 30, 1999.  On that day, he stated, he faxed 
the applicant another CG-4809 for immediate return by fax, and advised the applicant 
to make a note on the date line that he had originally signed the form on November 11, 
1999.  Thus, the counsel stated, within 15 working days of the day the applicant was 
notified of the CPEB’s findings, he verbally indicated his intention to reject the findings 
and also claimed that he had mailed off the CG-4809, formally rejecting the findings.  
However, the CG-4809 allegedly mailed by the applicant within the prescribed 15 days 
was never received. 
 

APPLICANT’S RESPONSE TO THE VIEWS OF THE COAST GUARD 

 
 
On November 17, 2000, the BCMR sent the applicant a copy of the views of the 
Coast  Guard  and  invited  him  to  respond  within  15  days.    In  response,  the  applicant 
called the BCMR on November 22, 2000, and stated that he would need an extension to 
consult with his attorney.  The applicant was informed that his request for an extension 

 

must be submitted in writing.  On November 27, 2000, the BCMR received a letter from 
the  applicant  in  which  he  disagreed  with  the  recommendation  of  the  Chief  Counsel.  
The  applicant  insisted  that  he  had  mailed  his  CG-4809  to  his  counsel  within  the  pre-
scribed 15 working days.  He failed to request an extension.   
 
 
On November 27, 2000, the BCMR wrote to the applicant’s attorney, informing 
her of the applicant’s phone call and enclosing a copy of the Chief Counsel’s advisory 
opinion.    The  Chairman  granted  the  applicant  a  30-day  extension  on  the  basis  of  his 
phone call.  However, no further responses have been received by the BCMR. 

 

 

APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE PDES MANUAL 

 
Chapter 8 of the PDES Manual governs the disposition of members on the TDRL.  
 
Paragraph A.6. provides that a member cannot stay on the TDRL, entitled to temporary 
disability retired pay, for more than five years.  Paragraph C states that members shall 
be  periodically  examined  while  on  the  TDRL  to  determine  if  their  conditions  have 
changed.  In addition, they must be examined at least once during their final year on the 
TDRL.  The examining physicians must prepare reports, including narrative summaries, 
laboratory studies, and clinical evaluations.  The report must be forwarded to the Coast 
Guard Personnel Command (CGPC) for consideration by the CPEB.  Paragraph E pro-
vides that after the member’s final examination while on the TDRL, a CPEB will con-
sider  his  case  and  make  recommendations  in  accordance  with  Paragraph  C.3.c.  of 
Chapter 2.  Thereafter, the procedures prescribed in Chapter 4 must be followed.   
 
 
Paragraph  C.3.c.  of  Chapter  2  of  the  PDES  Manual  requires  the  CPEB  that 
reviews the case of a member on the TDRL to make findings as to his fitness for duty 
and his degree of disability for each permanent ratable, service-connected medical con-
dition. 
 
 
Chapter 4 of the PDES Manual contains the procedures for CPEBs.  Paragraph 
A.13.a.  provides  that  the  Chief  Counsel’s  office  must  appoint  counsel  to  advise  each 
member undergoing review by a CPEB.  Paragraph A.13.b. provides that the counsel 
must contact the member within five working days of receiving the CPEB report and 
must advise the member “of the disability process and of the evaluee’s rights in light of 
the CPEB’s findings and recommended disposition. …  Upon completion of counseling, 
the designated counsel will forward the CPEB’s Findings and Recommended Disposi-
tion, CG-4809, to the evaluee for signature and subsequent return.” 
 
 
Paragraph A.14. of Chapter 4 provides that a member found unfit for duty by a 
CPEB may accept the findings or reject them and demand a formal hearing by an FPEB.  
If the member fails to do so within 15 working days from the date of written notification 
of the CPEB’s findings, “the conclusive presumption is that the evaluee is accepting the 

 

CPEB  findings  and  recommended  disposition  and  the  case  will  be  forwarded  to  [the 
Office of the Chief Counsel] for legal review.” 
 
Paragraph C of Chapter 4 provides that a CPEB’s recommended findings must 
 
be reviewed by a Physical Review Counsel and forwarded to the Chief Counsel’s office 
for a legal review.  Finally, they are forwarded to CGPC for final action. 

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 

 
 
The  Board  makes  the  following  findings  and  conclusions  on  the  basis  of  the 
applicant's military record and submissions, the Coast Guard's submissions, and appli-
cable law: 
 

The Board has jurisdiction concerning this matter pursuant to section 1552 

of title 10 of the United States Code.  The application was timely. 

3. 

The applicant requested an oral hearing before the Board.  The Chairman, 
acting pursuant to 33 C.F.R. § 52.31, denied the request and recommended disposition 
of the case without a hearing.  The Board concurs in that recommendation. 
 
 
The preponderance of the evidence indicates that the Coast Guard com-
mitted no error with respect to the applicant’s processing under the PDES.  After being 
placed on the TDRL in October 1994, he underwent periodic examinations at his local 
DVA hospital.  Tests in 1997 and 1999 showed only mild abnormalities in the cervical 
and  lumbar  regions  of  his  spine.    At  the  end  of  his  five  years  on  the  TDRL,  a  CPEB 
reviewed his case and concluded that he was only 10 percent disabled by intervertebral 
disc syndrome.  The applicant was timely notified, on Saturday, October 30, 1999, of the 
findings and recommendations of the CPEB that reviewed his case on October 14, 1999.  
The letter notifying him of those findings and recommendations included information 
concerning his legal rights and a form CG-4809 for his response.  He was also informed 
of  the  necessity  of returning  the  CG-4809  within  15  working  days  of  notification—by 
Monday,  November  22,  1999—if  he  wished  to  reject  the  CPEB  findings  and  have  his 
case heard by an FPEB. 
 
 
The record indicates that the applicant’s counsel properly informed him of 
his rights and warned him of the possibility that he might lose his entitlement to dis-
ability  benefits  if  he  failed  to  respond  timely  in  the  notification  letter  the  applicant 
received on October 30, 1999.  The record also indicates that the counsel telephoned him 
twice within the 15-working-day period to inform him that his rejection had not been 
received.    However,  no  CG-4809  signed  within  the  15-working-day  period  was  ever 
received by the Coast Guard.  The counsel apparently telephoned the applicant again 
on November 30, 1999, and faxed him another CG-4809, which was returned by fax the 
same day.  However, under Chapter 4.A.14. of the PDES Manual, the applicant’s failure 

4. 

 

1. 

 
2. 

 

5. 

6. 

7. 

to respond timely was conclusively presumed to signify his acquiescence in the CPEB’s 
findings  and  recommended  disposition,  and  final  action  was  taken  to  approve  them 
that same day. 
 
 
The applicant alleged that he did mail the CG-4809, rejecting the CPEB’s 
findings and recommended disposition, during the 15-working-day period.  In his affi-
davit, the applicant’s counsel stated that the second time he called him, near the end of 
the period, the applicant told him that he had already returned the form by mail after 
the first phone call.  However, that rejection form was never received in the mail by the 
applicant’s counsel.   
 
 
Although  the  applicant  has  not  proved  that  the  Coast  Guard  erred  in 
processing his case under the PDES, the Board is also authorized to remedy injustices in 
military records and must consider whether his 10-percent disability rating, discharge 
with separation pay, and the Coast Guard’s refusal to grant him a hearing by an FPEB, 
despite his untimely rejection of the CPEB’s findings, “shocks the sense of justice.” See 
Reale v. United States, 208 Ct. Cl. 1010, 1011 (1976) (“Injustice” is treatment by the mili-
tary authority that shocks the sense of justice, but is not technically illegal). 
 
 
Under Chapter 4.A.14. of the PDES Manual, the Coast Guard’s failure to 
receive  the  applicant’s  timely  rejection  of  the  CPEB  findings  created  a  conclusive 
presumption  that  it  was  not  mailed  within  the  prescribed  period.    The  Coast  Guard 
committed no error in acting on that presumption and approving the CPEB’s report.  To 
overcome this presumption, the applicant must prove by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that he did mail his rejection on time.  In BMC Bankcorp v. Internal Revenue Serv., 
1994  U.S.  Dist.  LEXIS  8404  (June  6,  1994),  the  court  found  that,  although  the  plaintiff 
used  ordinary  mail  to  mail  a  claim  to  the  IRS  for  1988  and  so  had  no  receipt  for  his 
timely filing, circumstances proved that he had mailed his claim  on time because the 
IRS did receive his claims for 1989 and 1990, which he mailed the same day, within the 
statutory period.  In this case, the record indicates that the applicant told his counsel 
during  their  second  phone  call  that  he  had  already  mailed  his  rejection.    The  Chief 
Counsel stated that the applicant should have returned his rejection in time because he 
was  familiar  with  the  process.    The  Board  finds  that  this  same  familiarity  lends  con-
siderable credence to the applicant’s claim that he did mail his rejection on time even 
though it was never received by his counsel.  Moreover, the Board notes that the appli-
cant  not  only  timely  appealed  his  CPEB  findings  in  1994  and  1997,    but  also  timely 
appealed disability rating decisions by the DVA.  Therefore, the Board is persuaded that 
the applicant did mail his rejection on time but naively trusted the regular mail and the 
in-house mail distribution system at the Coast Guard to deliver it.   
 

The applicant served on active duty for more than 16 years and has more 
than 17 years of total honorable military service.  His current DVA combined disability 
rating for his back problems, arthritic ankle, and hypertension is 50 percent.  His record 

8. 

 

indicates that he suffers from chronic back pain because of a service-connected disabil-
ity.  Therefore, the Board finds that depriving the applicant of a  hearing by an FPEB 
because he naively trusted the regular mail to deliver his rejection and separating him 
with  severance  pay  and  a  10-percent  disability  rating  constituted  an  injustice  that 
“shocks  the  sense  of  justice”  even  though  the  Coast  Guard  committed  no  errors  in 
processing him under the PDES.   
  

9. 

Accordingly, the applicant’s request should be granted in part by granting 

him a hearing by an FPEB. 
 
 
 
 
 
 

[ORDER AND SIGNATURES APPEAR ON NEXT PAGE]

 

 

ORDER 

 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 
Christopher A. Cook 

The  application  of  former  XXXXXXXXX,  USCG,  for  correction  of  his  military 
record  is  hereby  granted  as  follows:    His  record  shall  be  corrected  to  show  that  he 
timely  rejected  the  findings  and  recommended  disposition  of  the  CPEB  that  met  on 
October  14,  1999,  and  is  entitled  to  a  hearing  by  an  FPEB  in  accordance  with  the 
provisions of the PDES Manual, COMDTINST M1850.2 (series). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
L. L. Sutter 

 
 

 

 
Michael K. Nolan